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Embodied  cognition  is  a  hot  topic  in both cognitive  science  and  AI, despite  the fact  that  there  still  is
relatively  little  consensus  regarding  what  exactly  constitutes  ‘embodiment’.  While  most  embodied  AI and
cognitive robotics  research  views  the  body  as  the  physical/sensorimotor  interface  that  allows  to  ground
computational  cognitive  processes  in  sensorimotor  interactions  with  the  environment,  more  biologically-
based  notions  of  embodied  cognition  emphasize  the  fundamental  role  that  the  living body  – and  more
speciﬁcally  its  homeostatic/allostatic  self-regulation  – plays  in  grounding  both  sensorimotor  interactions
and  embodied  cognitive  processes.  Adopting  the  latter  position  – a multi-tiered  affectively  embodied
view  of cognition  in  living  systems  – it is  further  argued  that  modeling  organisms  as layered  networks  ofomeostasis
mbodied AI
mbodied cognition
motion
ntentionality
redictive regulation
bodily  self-regulation  mechanisms  can make  signiﬁcant  contributions  to our  scientiﬁc  understanding  of
embodied  cognition.
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. Introduction
At some point in the long and winding write-up of this paper,
ts title was “What makes embodied AI embodied?”. That title even-
ually disappeared again, but the question is still highly relevant
o this paper – and the answer is not as straightforward as one
ight think. Robots are, no doubt, considered ‘embodied’ by most
AI research, however, also makes use of simulated robots or other
types of non-physical agents, e.g. so-called virtual agents or differ-
ent types of more abstract artiﬁcial-life agents. Hence, one might
ask (cf. Ziemke, 2004) whether embodied AI really is about embod-
ied (i.e. physical, robotic, etc.) models of cognition, or rather about
models – any type of model: robotic ones obviously, but also purelyI researchers, and in fact the obvious AI approach to modeling
atural embodied cognition or synthesizing artiﬁcial equivalents
hereof (cf., e.g. Ziemke, 2003; Morse et al., 2011). Much embodied
∗ Correspondence address: IDA, Linköping University, 58183 Linköping, Sweden.
E-mail addresses: tom.ziemke@liu.se, tom.ziemke@his.se
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biosystems.2016.08.005
303-2647/© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access a
d/4.0/).computational ones – of embodied cognition (whatever that is), or
maybe both? If you ﬁnd that question somewhat confusing, you are
not alone. As discussed in more detail in Section 2, despite more
than 25 years of research on embodied cognition and AI, and by
now a number of books on the topic (e.g. Varela et al., 1991; Clark,
1997; Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999; Gallagher, 2005; Ziemke et al.,
2006; Johnson, 2007; Thompson, 2007; Shapiro, 2010; Lindblom,
rticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
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015), there still is a perplexing diversity of notions of embodied
ognition as well as claims concerning its nature and relevance.
Given that this paper is part of a journal special issue on the rela-
ion between embodied AI and synthetic biology, it should come as
o surprise that it is argued here that synthetic biology research
ight be able to make signiﬁcant contributions to embodied AI
the details of how are beyond the scope of this paper though) – and
hereby also might help to clarify the role that biological embod-
ment plays in natural cognition. To what degree the underlying
iological mechanisms really do play a role in cognitive processes
nd capacities, is another open question in the cognitive sciences,
nd in fact not everybody would agree that they actually do play
ny role at all, other than that of a particular physical implementa-
ion that could just as well be replaced by another, non-biological
 e.g. computational and/or robotic – implementation. Different
rguments supporting the view that the underlying biology in gen-
ral, and bodily self-regulation in particular, actually does play a
rucial role in embodied cognition are discussed in more detail in
ection 3.
Section 4 then, ﬁnally, presents some discussion and con-
lusions. It will be argued that embodied cognition is not only
rounded in sensorimotor interaction with the environment –
 claim that most proponents of embodied cognition, and even
ome of its opponents, would agree to – but that at least natu-
al cognition is furthermore also deeply rooted in the underlying
iological mechanisms, and more speciﬁcally layered/nested net-
orks of homeostatic/allostatic bodily self-regulation mechanisms.
ence, the potential contribution of synthetic biology to embod-
ed cognition and AI, it will be argued, lies ﬁrst and foremost in
odeling/understanding/synthesizing the nature of organisms as
uch layered networks. This would be an important complement to
urrent work in embodied AI and cognitive architectures/robotics,
uch of which is predominantly concerned with layered architec-
ures for dealing with the complexities of perceiving and acting in
he external environment.
. What’s that thing called embodiment?
The embodied approach in cognitive science and AI has received
ncreasingly much attention in recent years. In fact, “Embod-
ed Cognition is sweeping the planet”, at least according to Fred
dams’ backcover book endorsement of the paperback edition of
hapiro’s (2010) book on the topic. Research on embodied cog-
ition has received signiﬁcant attention in the cognitive sciences
or at least 25 years now, if you count from the appearance of
arela, Thompson and Rosch’s book “The Embodied Mind” in 1991.
t should be noted though that despite this, at least at this point in
ime, there actually is no such thing as the embodied mind thesis
r paradigm. This is reﬂected, for example, by recent paper titles
uch as “Embodied cognition is not what you think it is” (Wilson and
olonka, 2013) and recent debates about the alleged “poverty of
mbodied cognition” (Goldinger et al., 2016; Killeen, 2016) that
eveal deep misunderstandings and wildly different (mis-) concep-
ions of even the most basic tenets of embodied cognition research.
From the embodied AI researcher’s perspective, on the other
and, what is and what is not embodied might seem relatively
traightforward: the computer programs of traditional AI research
re widely considered ‘disembodied’, whereas robots obviously are
mbodied – at least in some sense (cf. Ziemke, 2001b; Ziemke and
hill, 2014). Much early embodied AI research was  to some degree
riven by criticisms of traditional AI formulated by philosophers
uch as Dreyfus (1979), Searle (1980) and Harnad (1990). A key
oint in these criticisms was the lack of interaction between the
nternal representations – at the time typically symbolic ones – of
I programs and the external world they were supposed to repre-148 (2016) 4–11 5
sent. Dreyfus (1979), for example, inspired by Heidegger’s notion
of being-in-the-world, argued that any computer program “is
not always-already-in-a-situation. Even if it represents all human
knowledge in its stereotypes, including all possible types of human
situations, it represents them from the outside . . . It isn’t situated in
any one of them, and it may  be impossible to program it to behave
as if it were”. Searle’s (1980) criticism of computational AI systems,
based on his famous Chinese Room Argument,  was  that “the opera-
tion of such a machine is deﬁned solely in terms of computational
processes over formally deﬁned elements”, and that such “formal
properties are not by themselves constitutive of intentionality” –
which is the characteristic of human cognition that allows it to be
about the world. Harnad’s (1990) argument was  based on Searle’s,
but he referred to the problem of intentionality as a lack of ‘intrinsic
meaning’ in purely computational systems, which he argued could
be resolved by what he termed symbol grounding,  i.e. the grounding
of internal symbolic representations in sensorimotor interactions
with the environment.
Embodied approaches to AI – using robotic or simulated
‘autonomous agents’ – at least at a ﬁrst glance, allow computer
programs and the representations they are using, if any, to be
grounded in interactions with the physical environment through
the robot/agent platform’s sensorimotor capacities. Brooks, for
example, one of the pioneers of embodied AI, formulated what
he called “the two  cornerstones of the new approach to Artiﬁ-
cial Intelligence, situatedness and embodiment” (Brooks, 1991).
Embodiment from this perspective simply means that “robots have
bodies and experience the world directly – their actions are part of a
dynamic with the world and have immediate feedback on their own
sensations” (Brooks, 1991). According to Brooks, such systems are
physically grounded, and hence internally “everything is grounded
in primitive sensor motor patterns of activation” (Brooks, 1993).
Situatedness, accordingly, means that “robots are situated in the
world – they do not deal with abstract descriptions, but with the
here and now of the world directly inﬂuencing the behavior of the
system” (Brooks, 1991).
Hence, from the embodied AI perspective, things might seem
relatively uncomplicated: robots are embodied and situated in
roughly the same sense that humans and other animals are, and
thereby they at least potentially can overcome traditional AI’s
problems with intentionality or intrinsic meaning. The problem of
computer programs dealing with ungrounded representations is
solved through physical grounding and either not having any repre-
sentations at all (a la Brooks) or acquiring internal representations
through symbol/representation grounding (a la Harnad), i.e. devel-
oping such representations in the course of interaction with the
external world (e.g. learning a map  of the environment). It should
be noted though that this does not necessarily resolve the philo-
sophical problems discussed above. Searle, for example, already
back in 1980, presented – and rejected – what he called the ‘robot
reply’ to his own  Chinese Room Argument.  This entailed pretty much
exactly what is now called embodied AI,  namely computer pro-
grams running inside robots that interact with their environment
through sensors and actuators. In the terms of Searle’s argument,
to the person inside the Chinese Room, it does not make any dif-
ference whether or not inputs to and outputs from the Chinese
Room are connected to the sensors and motors of a robot – the per-
son inside the room still lacks the intentionality that characterizes
human cognition.
At this point it should be noted that for the purposes of this paper
it does not actually matter at all whether or not the reader is familiar
with the details of Searle’s Chinese Room Argument,  let alone con-
vinced of its validity. The argument has been discussed for more
than 35 years now (e.g. Harnad, 1989, 1990; Ziemke, 1999; Zlatev,
2001; Preston and Bishop, 2002) without reaching much consensus.
What is more interesting here though is that there are quite many
6 T. Ziemke / BioSystems 
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oig. 1. Current notions of embodied cognitive science and their historical roots.
dapted from Chemero (2009: 30).
mbodied AI researchers who – like Searle – take the Chinese Room
rgument to be a valid argument against traditional AI, but at the
ame time – unlike Searle – consider the physical and sensorimotor
mbodiment provided by current robots to be sufﬁcient to over-
ome the problem (e.g. Harnad, 1989, 1990; Brooks, 1991, 1993;
lark, 1999; Zlatev, 2001; Chrisley and Ziemke, 2002; cf. Ziemke,
999). In Harnad’s (1989) terms, this type of embodied AI has gone
rom a computational functionalism to a robotic functionalism.  Zlatev
2001), for example, explicitly formulated the functionalist posi-
ion that there is “no good reason to assume that intentionality
s an exclusively biological property (pace e.g. Searle)”, and “thus a
obot with bodily structures, interaction patterns and development
imilar to those of human beings . . . could possibly recapitulate
human] ontogenesis, leading to the emergence of intentionality,
onsciousness and meaning”. Others, including Searle naturally, do
ndeed believe that there are good reasons to assume that human-
ike – or, more generally, organism-like – intentionality is in fact
 biological property, and that it does in fact require a biological
ody (e.g. Varela et al., 1991; Stewart, 1996; Varela, 1997; Ziemke,
001a,b, 2007, 2008; Sharkey and Ziemke, 2001; Zlatev, 2002;
ickhard, 2009; Froese and Ziemke, 2009; Vernon et al., 2015). The
atter perspective is elaborated in more detail in Section 3.
But, before we get there, let us a have quick look at Chemero’s
2009) characterization of the current embodied cognition research
andscape, which is illustrated in Fig. 1. Chemero points out that
here currently are at least two very different positions/traditions
hat are both referred to as ‘embodied cognitive science’. One of these,
hich Chemero refers to as radical embodied cognitive science,  is
rounded in the anti-representationalist and anti-computationalist
raditions of eliminativism, American naturalism, and Gibsonian
cological psychology. The other, more mainstream version of
mbodied cognitive science,  on the other hand, in line with what
as referred to as robotic functionalism above, is derived from
raditional representationalist and computationalist theoretical
rameworks, and therefore also still is more or less compatible
ith these – as illustrated maybe most prominently by the notion
f symbol/representation grounding, as opposed to the more radi-
al position of anti-representationalism. As Chemero rightly points
ut, although – or maybe because – the mainstream version of
mbodied cognitive science can be considered a “watered-down”
ersion of its more radical counterpart, it currently receives signif-
cantly more attention in the cognitive sciences.
The position of radical embodied cognition, according to
hemero (2009), can be summarized in two positive claims and
ne negative one:148 (2016) 4–11
1. Representational and computational views of embodied cogni-
tion are wrong.
2. Embodied cognition should be explained using a particular set
of tools T, including dynamical systems theory.
3. The explanatory tools in set T do not posit mental representa-
tions.
To summarize the discussion so far, it should now be clearer
why exactly it is still surprisingly difﬁcult to pinpoint what embod-
ied cognition is, or what kind of embodiment an artiﬁcial cognitive
system might require. There are different positions along at least
a couple of dimensions of embodiment: physicality, the view of
representation, and the role of the underlying biology. Embodied
AI researchers emphasize the importance of physical grounding,
but in their research practice they commonly make use of software
simulations (cf. Ziemke, 2003), and the computer programs control-
ling their robots – physical or simulated – are for the most part still
just as computational as the computer programs of traditional AI.
Radical embodied cognitive science, at least according to Chemero,
is strictly anti-representationalist, whereas mainstream embodied
cognitive science more or less still embraces the traditional com-
putationalist/representationalist framework, but emphasizes the
need for representations to be grounded, i.e. a robotic functionalism
instead of the traditional computational functionalism. Naturally,
the role of the biological mechanisms underlying (embodied) cog-
nition is also fundamentally different on the left and the right side of
Chemero’s diagram (cf. Fig. 1). While on the right/mainstream side,
the biological embodiment of natural cognition would be consid-
ered as just one possible ‘implementation’, which could as well be
replaced by alternative, e.g. computational and/or robotic imple-
mentations, the left/radical side is at least more open to the idea of
the living body actually having some fundamental role in consti-
tuting embodied cognition. Which leads us to the next section.
3. Does life matter to embodied cognition?
As pointed out in the previous section, the nature, role, and
conception of ‘the body’ are actually still far from well-deﬁned in
embodied cognitive science – and embodied AI in particular. As
discussed in more detail elsewhere (Ziemke, 2000, 2004, 2007),
on the one hand, much embodied AI research, in particular the
widespread emphasis of the importance of physical embodiment
(e.g. Brooks, 1991, 1993; Steels, 1994; Pfeifer, 1995; Pfeifer and
Scheier, 1999), is actually to a high degree compatible with the
view of robotic functionalism (Harnad, 1989), according to which
embodiment is mainly about symbol/representation grounding
(Harnad, 1990; cf. Anderson, 2003; Chrisley, 2003; Pezzulo et al.,
2013), whereas cognition can still be conceived of as computa-
tion. On the other hand, much of the rhetoric in the embodied AI
ﬁeld, in particular early embodied AI researchers’ rejection of tra-
ditional notions of representation and cognition as computation
(e.g. Brooks, 1991; Pfeifer, 1995; Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999), sug-
gests sympathy for more radical notions of embodied cognition
that view all of cognition as embodied and/or rooted in the mech-
anisms of the living body (e.g. Maturana and Varela, 1987; Varela
et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007; Johnson, 2007; Froese and Ziemke,
2009). More speciﬁcally, part of the problem with embodied AI
is that, despite its strong biological inspiration, early embodied
AI research very much focused on establishing itself as a new
paradigm within AI and cognitive science, i.e. as an alternative to
the traditional functionalist/computationalist paradigm (e.g. Beer,
1995; Pfeifer, 1995; Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999). Less effort was made,
on the other hand, to make the connection to other theories, out-
side AI, e.g. in theoretical biology or phenomenology, addressing
core conceptual issues of autonomy, embodiment, etc. Similarly,
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uch embodied AI research distinguishes itself from its traditional
I counterpart in its interactive view of knowledge. For exam-
le, work on adaptive robotics, in particular evolutionary robotics
Nolﬁ and Floreano, 2000) and developmental/epigenetic robotics
e.g. Zlatev and Balkenius, 2001; Berthouze and Ziemke, 2003;
ungarella et al., 2003), is largely compatible with the construc-
ivist/enactivist/interactivist view (e.g. Piaget, 1954; Varela et al.,
991; Bickhard, 1993, 2009; Ziemke, 2001a) of knowledge con-
truction in sensorimotor interaction with the environment, with
he goal of achieving some ‘ﬁt’ or ‘equilibrium’ between inter-
al, conceptual/behavior-generating mechanisms and the external
nvironment (for a more detailed discussion of this aspect see
iemke, 2001a).
However, the organic roots of these processes, which were
mphasized in, for example, the theoretical biology of von Uexküll
1928, 1982) or Maturana and Varela’s (1980, 1987) theory of
utopoiesis (cf. below), are usually ignored in embodied AI, most of
hich still operates with a view of the body that is largely com-
atible with mechanistic theories in psychology and a view of
ontrol mechanisms that is still largely compatible with compu-
ationalism (cf. Ziemke, 2000, 2001a). That means, the robot body
s typically viewed as some kind of input and output device that
rovides physical grounding to the internal computational mecha-
isms. As discussed above, this view of the physical body as the
omputational mind’s sensorimotor interface to the world per-
ades much of cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Thus, in
ractice, embodied AI as a result of its history and interdisciplinary
nﬂuences, has become a theoretical hybrid, combining a mechan-
cal/behaviorist view of the body with the constructivist notion
f interactive knowledge as well as the functionalist hardware-
oftware distinction and its view of the activity of the nervous
ystem as computational (cf. Ziemke, 2000, 2001a,b, 2004, 2007).
As Greenspan and Baars (2005) have pointed out (cf. also
harkey and Ziemke, 1998, 2001; Ziemke, 2001a), the mechanis-
ic/reductionistic approach to biology and psychology of leading
arly 19th-century researchers like Loeb (1918) and Pavlov (1927)
aved the way for the strong dominance of behaviorism in
sychology, as pursued by Watson (1925) and Skinner (1938).
ognitive science, with its traditional emphasis on representa-
ion and computation, is widely considered to have replaced the
verly mechanistic view of behaviorism. However, as Costall (2006)
ointed out that, “it is not the case that mainstream cognitive
sychology entirely replaced the traditional mechanistic model. It
etains the old mechanistic image of the body. The new mecha-
ism of mind has been merely assimilated to the old dualism of
ind and body, along with the existing conception of the body as
 passive machine”. Although Costall’s critique is directed mainly
t traditional cognitive science and AI, rather than embodied AI, it
hould be noted that the mind/body or hardware/software dualism
hat he accuses modern psychology of is the exact same dualism
hat Searle (1980) accuses computationalist theories of. And, as
iscussed above, as Searle pointed out already back then in his
obot reply, whether or not the computational mind resides in
 slightly less passive robotic body, i.e. a physical container that
llows the computational mind to interact with its environment
hrough sensors and actuators, really does not make much of a dif-
erence when it comes to such computational/robotic systems as
odels of human cognition, intentionality, etc.
So, what is the alternative then? We  have already seen various
limpses of theoretical frameworks that emphasize the biological
ature and/or the organismic roots of natural embodied cognition,
ut what exactly are these frameworks?Let us start with the theory of autopoiesis (Varela et al., 1974;
aturana and Varela, 1980, 1987; Varela, 1979, 1997). According
o Varela (1997, p. 75): “An autopoietic system – the minimal living
rganization – is one that continuously produces the components148 (2016) 4–11 7
that specify it, while at the same time realizing it (the system)
as a concrete unit in space and time, which makes the network
of production of components possible. More precisely deﬁned: An
autopoietic system is organized (deﬁned as a unity) as a network
of processes of production (synthesis and destruction) of compo-
nents such that these components: (i) continuously regenerate and
realize the network that produces them, and (ii) constitute the sys-
tem as a distinguishable unity in the domain in which they exist”.
Prime examples of autopoiesis are living cells and organisms, also
referred to as “ﬁrst-order” and “second-order autopoietic unities”
respectively (e.g. Maturana and Varela, 1987).
Somewhat controversially, Maturana and Varela (1980, 1987)
actually consider all living systems to be cognitive systems. Nat-
urally, this has been criticized by a number of authors who  wish
to reserve the term ‘cognitive’ for higher-level psychological pro-
cesses (cf., e.g., Clark, 1997; Barandiaran and Moreno, 2006). Varela,
however, defended the use of the term ‘cognitive’ as follows: “The
reader may  balk at my  use of the term cognitive for cellular systems.
But from what I have said it should be clear that the constitution of
a cognitive domain links organisms and their worlds in a way that
is the very essence of intentionality as used in modern cognitive
science, and as it was originally introduced in phenomenology. My
proposal makes explicit the process through which intentionality
arises: it amounts to an explicit hypothesis about how to transform
the philosophical notion of intentionality into a principle of natural
science. The use of the term cognitive here is thus justiﬁed because
it is at the very base of how intentionality arises in nature” (Varela,
1997, pp. 80–81).
For a competing, but closely related theoretical framework, let
us also have a look at Christensen and Hooker’s (2000) theory
of autonomy,  aimed to propose a naturalistic theory of intelli-
gent agency as an embodied feature of organized, typically living,
dynamical systems. According to their view, agents are entities that
engage in goal-directed, normatively constrained, interaction with
their environment. More speciﬁcally, “[l]iving systems are a partic-
ular kind of cohesive system . . . in which there are dynamical bonds
amongst the elements of the system which individuate the system
from its environment”. Some examples: A gas has no internal cohe-
sion, its shape and condition are imposed by the environment. A
rock, on the other hand, has internal bonds and behaves as an inte-
gral whole. However, these cohesive bonds are passive and rigid
(i.e. stable deep-energy-well interactions are constraining the con-
stituents spatially), and they are local (i.e. there are no essential
constraints on the boundary of the system). A cell, ﬁnally, has cohe-
sive bonds and acts as an integrated whole, but those bonds are
active (i.e. chemical bonds formed by shallow-energy-well inter-
actions and continually actively remade), ﬂexible (i.e. interactions
can vary, are sensitive to system and environmental changes), and
holistic (i.e. binding forces depend on globally organized interac-
tions; i.e. local processes must interact globally to ensure the cell’s
survival). Autonomous systems then, according to Christensen and
Hooker (2000), are cohesive systems of the same general type as
the cell. Their examples of autonomous systems include cells and
organisms, as for autopoiesis, but also molecular catalytic bi-cycles,
species, and colonies (for details see Christensen and Hooker, 2000).
Regarding the differences between their theory of autonomy and
the theory of autopoiesis, Christensen and Hooker (2000) argue that
the paradigm case of autopoiesis is the operationally closed system
that produces all its components within itself, whereas their the-
ory of autonomy emphasizes agent-environment interaction and a
“directive organisation [that] induces pattern-formation of energy
ﬂows from the environmental milieu into system-constitutive pro-
cesses”. However, as Varela (1997:82) pointed out, in the theory
of autopoiesis the term operational closure “is used in its mathe-
matical sense of recursivity, and not in the sense of closedness or
isolation from interaction, which would be, of course, nonsense”.
8 stems 148 (2016) 4–11
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Fig. 2. Damasio’s illustration of ‘levels of automated homeostatic regulation, from T. Ziemke / BioSy
What these theoretical frameworks share is the view that living
rganisms have a particular organization, and that they take this
rganization to be fundamental to natural cognition. This is also
he case for Bickhard’s (1993, 2009) notion of cognitive systems as
ecursively self-maintaining, far-from-thermodynamic-equilibrium
ystems. As Bickhard (personal communication) points out, current
obots have “no intrinsic stake in the world nor in their existence
n the world nor in their existence as social agents”. Discussing
he case of a robot that regularly recharges its battery, which is a
ommon scenario in embodied AI research (e.g. Montebelli et al.,
013), Bickhard (2009) emphasizes that the “contrast with the bio-
ogical case arises in the fact that most of the robot’s body is not
ar-from-equilibrium, cannot be self-maintained, and certainly not
ecursively self-maintained. Conversely, the only part of the robot
hat is far from equilibrium, the battery, is not self-maintaining”.
Interestingly, despite all similarities in the above theoretical
rameworks, while the theory of autopoiesis and the underlying
iology of cognition adopt a strictly anti-representationalist view
f cognition, in Bickhard’s interactivist theory of mind, with which
lso Christensen and Hooker sympathize, so-called interactive rep-
esentations play a crucial role. This indicates that Chemero’s above
llustration of the embodied cognition research landscape might
ot necessarily provide a complete picture, and there might be
oom for conceptions of cognition as a biological phenomenon
hat reject the traditional functionalist/computationalist view,
nd maybe also reject the traditional notion of representation,
ut without necessarily committing to the eliminativism/anti-
epresentationalism that characterizes radical embodied cognition
ccording to Chemero. We  will get back to this point.
The above characterizations of cognitive systems as
utonomous, self-maintaining, and to some degree self-producing,
iving systems of course have a number of historical precursors.
his includes the concept of autonomy in von Uexküll’s (1928,
982) theoretical biology and theory of meaning (cf. Ziemke,
000, 2001a; Ziemke and Sharkey, 2001) as well as Spinoza’s 17-th
entury concept of the conatus, which Damasio (2003) summarized
s follows:
“It is apparent that the continuous attempt at achieving a state
of positively regulated life is a deep and deﬁning part of our exis-
tence – the ﬁrst reality of our existence as Spinoza intuited when
he described the relentless endeavour (conatus) of each being
to preserve itself. . . . Interpreted with the advantages of current
hindsight, Spinoza’s notion implies that the living organism is
constructed so as to maintain the coherence of its structures and
functions against numerous life-threatening odds. The conatus
subsumes both the impetus for self-preservation in the face
of danger and opportunities and the myriad actions of self-
preservation that hold the parts of the body together. In spite
of the transformations the body must undergo as it develops,
renews its constituent, and ages, the conatus continues to form
the same individual and respect the same structural design.”
(Damasio, 2003, p. 36)
Damasio has criticized “the prevalent absence of a notion of
rganism in the sciences of mind and brain” as a problem, which
e elaborated as follows: “It is not just that the mind remained
inked to the brain in a rather equivocal relationship, but that the
rain remained consistently separated from the body and thus not
art of the deeply interwoven mesh of body and brain that deﬁnes
 complex living organism” (Damasio, 1998, p. 84). His own  the-
retical framework, much in line with his above interpretation of
pinoza, is based on the view that “[nature has] built the apparatus
f rationality not just on top of the apparatus of biological regula-
ion, but also from it and with it” (Damasio, 1994, p. 128). This view
s shared by somatic theories of emotion and consciousness, includ-simple to complex’, constituting what Panksepp (2005) called “a multi-tiered affec-
tively embodied view of mind”. Illustration from Ziemke (2008: 406); adapted from
Damasio (2003: 32).
ing the work of Damasio (1998, 1999, 2003), Panksepp (2005), and
Prinz (2004), as well their historical predecessors, James (1884) and
Lange (1885). What these theories agree on, in a nutshell, is that
emotions arise from multiple, nested levels of homeostatic reg-
ulation of bodily activity (cf. Fig. 2), and that emotional feelings
are feelings of such bodily changes (cf. Prinz, 2004). According to
Panksepp (2005), somatic theories constitute “a multi-tiered affec-
tively embodied view of mind” (Panksepp, 2005, p. 63).
Such somatic theories can be considered a biologically-
based, but representational view of cognition, although with a
non-traditional twist: here the representations are not body-
internal representations of body- or agent-external objects or
states of affairs, but rather the brain’s representations of ﬁrst
and foremost bodily activity, albeit indirectly of course also
the environment. According to Prinz, “emotions can represent
core relational themes without explicitly describing them. Emo-
tions track bodily states that reliably co-occur with important
organism–environment relations, so emotions reliably co-occur
with important organism–environment relations. Each emotion is
both an internal body monitor and a detector of dangers, threats,
losses, or other matters of concern. Emotions are gut reactions; they
use our bodies to tell us how we are faring in the world” (Prinz,
2004, p. 69). Similarly, Damasio has proposed that the essence of
feelings of emotion lies in the mapping of bodily emotional states
in the body-sensing regions of the brain, including somato-sensory
cortex (Damasio, 1999, 2004). Such mental imagery of emotional
bodily reactions is also crucial to Damasio’s concept of the as-
if body loop, a neural internal simulation mechanism (using the
brain’s body maps, bypassing the actual body), whose cognitive
function and adaptive value are as follows: “Whereas emotions
provide an immediate reaction to certain challenges and opportu-
nities . . . [t]he adaptive value of feelings comes from amplifying the
mental impact of a given situation and increasing the probabilities
that comparable situations can be anticipated and planned for in
the future so as to avert risks and take advantage of opportunities”
(Damasio, 2004, pp. 56–57).
Since in the above discussion of somatic theories the notion
of homeostatic bodily regulation has been mentioned, it should
be noted that the term homeostasis here is used in the wider
sense, as used by Damasio and Carvalho (2013), i.e. the “process of
maintaining the internal milieu physiological parameters (such as
temperature, pH and nutrient levels) of a biological system within
the range that facilitates survival and optimal function”, rather
than the narrower sense that emphasizes constancy. As discussed
in more detail elsewhere (Vernon et al., 2015), of particular rele-
vance to theories and models of embodied cognition is in fact the
concept of predictive (self-) regulation or allostasis (Sterling, 2004,
2012; Schulkin, 2011). In line with the notion of the as-if body loop
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iscussed above, Sterling (2012) points out: “The brain monitors a
ery large number of external and internal parameters to anticipate
hanging needs, evaluate priorities, and prepare the organism to
atisfy them before they lead to errors. The brain even anticipates
ts own local needs, increasing ﬂow to certain regions — before
here is an error signal”. In a similar vein, Seth (2013) has argued
hat “an organism should maintain well-adapted predictive mod-
ls of its own physical body . . . and of its internal physiological
ondition” (Seth, 2013, p. 567).
To sum up this section, before we move to the next, there are a
umber of overlapping theoretical frameworks that take cognition
o be a genuinely biological phenomenon occurring in living organ-
sms, and therefore emphasize the fundamental role played by the
iving body in general, and mechanisms of homeostatic/allostatic
elf-regulation in particular, in natural embodied cognition in liv-
ng organisms. This clearly goes beyond the somewhat mechanistic
iew of the physical body as the computational mind’s sensorimo-
or interface to the world, which pervades much of mainstream
embodied) cognitive science and in particular embodied AI. While
he controversial issue of ‘representation’ naturally is too complex
o discuss in detail – let alone resolve – in this paper, the above dis-
ussion hopefully illustrates at least to some degree the potential
ole and nature of non-traditional ‘representations’1 – in the sense
f predictive models – in biologically-based, non-functionalist con-
eptions of embodied cognition.
. Discussion and conclusion
As Black (2014) has recently pointed out, we “seem to have an
nnate propensity to see bodies wherever we look” (p. 16). This is
ue to the the fact we “consistently anthropomorphise machines,
ur attempts to conceptualise unfamiliar new artefacts falling back
n the most fundamental and sophisticated frameworks for under-
tanding animation we  have – those related to the human body”
Black, 2014, p. 38). Hence, the question “What is a body?” or “What
s embodied?” is actually rarely asked. In embodied AI research
obots are usually considered as ‘embodied’ as a matter of fact, sim-
ly because, unlike most traditional AI systems, they are physical
nd can interact with their environment through sensors and actu-
tors. The fact that robot bodies in most cases actually have very
ittle in common with the bodies of living organisms is not given
qually much attention.
As discussed in Section 2, most work in embodied cognitive sci-
nce falls into the category Chemero (2009) refers to as mainstream
mbodied cognitive science, which still is more or less compatible
ith traditional computationalist and representationalist concep-
ions of cognition, which to some degree reduce the body to the
omputational mind’s physical/sensorimotor interface to the world
hat it represents internally. Radical embodied cognitive science
ejects these traditional notions, but at least in Chemero’s formu-
ation of the main claims/tenets of radical embodied cognition, it
lso does not emphasize the biological nature of embodied cog-
ition as such, but focuses on explaining perception and action
n dynamical-systems terms rather than representational terms.
ccordingly, most research in embodied AI, of both the represen-
ationalist and the anti-representationalist type, has focused on
ensorimotor interaction between agents and their physical and
ocial environments, i.e. on grounding cognition in sensorimotor
nteraction. Naturally, physical robots and simulated robotic agents
re the tools of choice for this type of embodied AI.
From the perspective of the theories discussed in Section 3
hough, embodied cognition is not only grounded in sensorimotor
1 Considering the emphasis on prediction, it might in fact be more accurate to
hink  of them as pre-presentations, or simply pre-sentations.148 (2016) 4–11 9
interaction with the environment. At least in the case of natu-
ral cognition, that sensorimotor interaction with the environment
is itself deeply rooted in the underlying biological mechanisms,
and more speciﬁcally layered/nested networks of bodily self-
regulation mechanisms. According to Damasio and others, the
connection lies in emotional mechanisms playing a crucial role in
this self-regulation, fulﬁlling on the one hand a survival-related
(bioregulatory, adaptive, homeostatic/allostatic) function, and, on
the other hand, constituting the basis of higher-level cognition, self
and consciousness. Panksepp (2005) refers to this as “a multi-tiered
affectively embodied view of mind”, which clearly goes beyond the
physical/sensorimotor embodiment that current robots are limited
to.
If we  adopt the latter view of embodied cognition as a ﬁrst
and foremost biological phenomenon, then clearly embodied
AI is still lacking in complex models of such multi-level net-
works/hierarchies of self-regulation mechanisms – reaching from
low-level bioregulatory mechanisms to higher levels of embod-
ied emotion and cognition – and possibly the development of
computational cognitive architectures for robotic systems tak-
ing into account some of these mechanisms (cf. Ziemke and
Lowe, 2009; Lowe and Ziemke, 2011; Vernon et al., 2015).
Accordingly, an important potential contribution of synthetic biol-
ogy research to embodied AI, and the understanding of natural
embodied cognition, then probably lies ﬁrst and foremost in mod-
eling/understanding/synthesizing the nature of organisms as such
layered networks. This would be an important complement to cur-
rent work in embodied AI and cognitive robotics, much of which
is predominantly concerned with layered architectures for dealing
with the complexities of perceiving and acting in the world.
In closing, and at the risk of pointing out the obvious, it
should also be noted that the two types of embodied AI discussed
here, focusing on grounding embodied cognition in sensorimotor
interaction, and on grounding sensorimotor interaction in bodily
regulation, respectively, are of course highly complementary. This
applies not only to embodied AI, but also to our understanding of
embodied cognition in general. Hence, Johnson’s (2007) description
of his own  work on the embodiment of language, which initially
focused on understanding the grounding of language in sensori-
motor interaction, also characterizes very well the development of
embodied approaches in cognitive science and AI in general:
“In retrospect I now see that the structural aspects of our bodily
interactions with our environments upon which I was  focusing
were themselves dependent on even more submerged dimen-
sions of bodily understanding. It was  an important step to probe
below concepts, propositions, and sentences into the sensori-
motor processes by which we understand our world, but what
is now needed is a far deeper exploration into the qualities,
feelings, emotions, and bodily processes that make meaning
possible.” (Johnson, 2007).
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